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Summary 
This thesis is concerned with a topic in behavioral economics that is a relatively new and fast 
growing area of study. An area close tied up with psychology since we are looking into how 
people behave under certain scenarios or settings. 
 
 This thesis is built up by motivational and theoretical discussion, before looking at the data 
collected during two experiments using Z-Tree software by Urs Fischbacher. For regression I 
used Stata 9.0. 
 
The experimental setting I used were a variant of a so-called public good game with 
punishment. In this game the participant contribute to a common good and get something in 
return from this good. It is constructed such as to give a conflict between individual and group 
interests. After the contribution it is possible to punish other players on the background of 
their and everybody else’s contribution behavior. 
 
The motivational section contains short history of public good game and behavioral 
economics as well. One important aspect of my experiment is the punishment. Since I’m 
doing a public good game where participants contribute to a common good, I have opened up 
for punishment by revealing contributions of individuals. This revealing is of course 
anonymous, but participants can target punishment based on these contributions. This will be 
rigorously explained in main body of text. 
 
My main motivation for this thesis is to look into if groupsize has an effect on how much 
people punish each other. Therefore, I constructed two treatments; one where participants 
could punish all other participants (16-1) and one were they could only punish three other 
assigned to same group (16-4). The contribution group was equal in both treatments, i.e. all 
contributed to the same common good/pool. This way I ensured that there was only one 
difference between the two treatments. 
 
My hypothesis is as follows: 
“For any given individual contribution by individual i , this individual i  is punished less by 
others in the 16-1 treatment than in the 16-4 treatment.” 
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Then there is a chapter of how we conducted the experiment. We held the experiment in 
Norwegian, but all the rules and instructions are reproduced in English. In the appendix, I 
have enclosed a Norwegian version of the instructions as presented to the participants. All 
participants got a handout of the instructions in addition to an oral presentation by reading the 
exact content by my assistant. At the end of this chapter, a more mathematical presentation of 
the game is given and a clarifying part of the difference between the two treatments as 
mentioned above.  
 
A theoretical chapter explaining alternative behavioral traits comes after this. Here I look at 
Homo economicus, as a selfish and rational actor with preferences for only maximum 
economic outcome. I compare this with other preferences that can explain why people 
contribute and punish in this game setting. 
 
The result chapter is somewhat limited, since one of my treatments failed. However, I did a 
simple linear regression to see if there was any effect of groupsize on punishment. The lack of 
complete dataset resulted in inconclusive outcome, but I got an indication that my hypothesis 
may be right. This can be a motivation for further studies into this problem; disintegrating of 
individual punishment in increasing groupsize. I also included some discussion of what went 
wrong as to enlighten those who may intend to use the same setup as I did. 
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1 Introduction 
You are in a group who need to cooperate to accomplish a certain goal, and one or more of 
you are not making adequate effort. How do you react? If you are the lazy one, how do the 
others react? How do you feel in any case? Do you think the size of the group matters for how 
you feel or react? 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to study individual behavior in public good games with 
sanctioning options. More specifically I want to explore whether the level of punishment from 
individuals is dependent on groupsize all else given, i.e. whether individual members of 
smaller groups punish more on an individual level, than they do in larger groups. 
 
1.1 Generality 
No matter how you live your life, you are bound to interact with other people. There may be 
some extreme cases where this is not true, but to live a normal life some interaction is not 
avoidable. You have to shop your groceries and other essentials, most of us have to work, 
many emphasize spending their spare time with friends, and you probably end up with a 
family at one point. By all this interaction, we are trying to cooperate with each other. In this 
thesis, I am focusing on how people react to different exertions toward a common good. 
Contribution and punishment set in a controllable environment. 
 
Sometimes you interact with few people, sometimes with many. This can very well influence 
the behavior of individuals: how you react to them and vice versa. Take a study group for 
example. Here you can choose your degree of preparation. You can prepare fully and 
contribute a lot to the discussion, or you can prepare nil and just at no cost harvest 
information from the discussion (not taken account of time spent during discussion). It is of 
course possible to prepare somewhat between fully and none at all, but the main point is how 
the others react to your preparation, and how is your reaction towards the others. Let us say 
that the study group of three has one lazy member. You may sanction him by facial 
expression (low cost) or directly by telling him what you think (high cost). Imagine the same 
setting, just in a bigger group. Then it may be more likely that each individual sanctions less 
believing others will step up and punish instead. This could then lead to a disintegrating of 
individual responsibility for punishment. 
  4 
   
I will in this thesis look into some aspects regarding punishment behavior with difference in 
groupsize. Before commenting any further on the above examples, I present an overview of 
the experiment. 
 
1.2 Rough overview of the experiment 
To collect data on behavioral traits resembling situations pictured in the preceding chapter I 
conducted an economic experiment. I did this economic experiment at a newly acquired 
computer lab
i
 consisting of laptop computers using the software Z-Tree. Z-Tree is a 
programming environment for setting up numerous types of experiments. For example, 
dictator/ultimatum games, public good games, auction games and so forth. Urs Fischbacher, a 
well renowned economic experimentalist, is the man behind this software
ii
. 
 
Even though the study group example presented above does not involve monetary sanctions, 
this is the main incentive in most economic experiments. In the real world punishments often 
is a mixture of psychological and physiological expressions, maybe to a greater extent than 
economic. With bodily expressions, we instantly think of psychology, and the case is that 
experimental economics is not that different (Rabin, 2002). Economists often use terms as 
rational, self-interested, stable utility functions, etc. However, in real life, humans do not 
always adhere to these “economic rules”. Much of behavioral economics has focused on 
exactly prying into such problems, by experimenting in laboratory or field setting. Contrary to 
psychologists, economists need measurable incentives, and a natural choice is monetary 
rewards and punishments. 
 
In chapter 3 I will go through the experiment in detail, but for motivational and background it 
is in place to give a simple outline. The main goal of the experiment is to see if large group 
constellations punish less than smaller ones at an individual level. To examine this I am doing 
a so-called public good game with punishment. This is a setup where participants can choose 
to contribute a share of their endowment to a common project. The sum of all contributions is 
multiplied by a factor (larger than one) and then divided equally between the participants. In 
the next phase participants have the opportunity, on the basis of information of contribution 
and outcome, to punish each other.   
                                                 
i
 Oeconlab at the University of Oslo 
ii
 For more information see: http://www.iew.unizh.ch/ztree/index.php  
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I do this twice with different subject pools. The contribution phase is equal in both treatments. 
The only difference is group size in the punishment phase. In the first treatment each subject 
gets information of all the participants’ contributions, but can only punish three exogenously 
selected other participants. In the second treatment each get the same information as in 
treatment 1, but here they can punish every other participant. 
 
This way I can examine if larger groups punish less than smaller ones at an individual level, 
given all else equal. 
 
While capturing the main intuitive idea of my hypothesis, the studygroup example is not 
entirely in line with my experiment. In the study group example, groupsize in contribution 
and punishment was equal. When forming a study group, you will most certainly interact with 
all the group members, both in contribution (individual preparation for the group) and in 
punishment (you meet all in the group at a set time for discussion), i.e. the two phases have 
equal groupsize. A correct model for examining that exact scenario would be to have two 
treatments where contribution- and punishment-groups are equal inside treatments, but 
different between treatments. In my design contribution group is equal in both treatments, but 
the punishment group differs in size. 
  
One other thought enlightening this is that if you have a study group of for example 10. When 
you meet the seating is organized so you can only interact fully with those close to you, then 
you have an ad hoc scenario, where group size differs in punishment, but are equal in 
contribution. 
 
The experimental goal can be of great interest in many ways, from social policies to firm 
behavior. In firms with an extended team based means of productions, an analytical approach 
to team size and structure could be of utter importance. Another probably important factor is 
the flow of information inside teams and between teams. In that connection we can view this 
thesis as trying to explain how people react to this flow of information about individual effort. 
My experimental setting builds upon information of other participant’s contribution. After the 
contribution phase (more detailed walkthrough of the experiment in chapter 3) every 
individual participant get an overview of the others contribution and payoff from that phase. 
There will not be any analysis of informational flow, but rather the reaction to it. 
  6 
   
 
In social context, there may also be a difference between small clusters of inhabitants 
compared to large ones. If you for example witnessed a crime or immoral act, are the reaction 
and action you take dependent of the size your social environment? How should the 
government then deal with this distinction in their pursuit for equality for all citizens? 
 
1.3 Public good 
In my thesis, I use a game type called public good experiment (Ledyard, 1995). In such 
games, participants get an endowment of and then are asked to decide how much of this they 
will contribute to a common good. All contributions to the common good are multiplied by a 
factor and divided equally among the participants. 
  
In economics, the standard definition of a public good is that it is non-rival and non-
excludable. Non-rival is when one person’s consumption not lowers another person’s 
consumption possibilities, and non-excludable is that there is not possible to shut a person out 
from consumption (Stiglitz, Walsh, 2002). The standard public good game I am doing here is 
not fully in accordance to this definition. In chapter 3.1 we see that the public good (all 
contributions multiplied by 2) is rival, that should indicate that the good in fact is a “common 
pool resource”. Then again, a “common pool resource” experiment is a term used for a 
slightly different game type. Therefore, we should stick to the well-grounded terms naming 
this a public good game. 
 
For an example of common pool resource game read “Covenants with and without sword: 
Self governance is possible” (Ostrom, 1992). 
 
1.4 Freeride 
One may think of freeriding, vaguely, as consuming more than a fair share of a resource, or 
contribute less than a fair share towards production. I believe everyone has experienced a 
freeriding problem in his or her daily life. It can be housework, voluntary communal work, 
carrying furniture together with another person, attending a study group etc. In this thesis, we 
have two types of free riding, one in the contribution- and one in the punishment phase.  
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Thus, the larger group there is in the punishment phase, the more people can sanction the 
same person. If punishers focus on this, they may think that their individual effect of 
punishment is smaller the more people there is to punish. At the same time, there are more 
people to sanction. We have two effects that pull in opposite directions, one involving 
freeriding, and one of social responsibility concerning punishing defectors. If my hypothesis 
is correct, freeriding dominates and disintegrates the responsibility for punishment. 
1.5 Short on Z-Tree 
Since this was the first time anyone had done any programming in Z-Tree at the University of 
Oslo, I used quite a good deal of time learning the programming language. A bit more time 
than planned, but I believe this was important to get a robust script and intuitive screen layout. 
The time used at programming reduced the chances of doing more radical program changes, if 
some treatments failed. In such a case I would be certain that there were little chance that this 
were caused be programming error. Nevertheless, problems still emerged as stated below. 
 
The first time I lost all the data. It seemed that one of the Z-Leafs (participant’s computer) 
went down, making the computer not respond at all. After a while, this made the Z-Tree 
(server program at the experiment leader’s computer) to go into no response. Somehow, all 
data were lost even though I believe Z-Tree writes and stores data between each period. 
 
The second time similar problems appeared and it stopped after three completed periods. 
Luckily, these data were stored and saved. We wanted to run the questionnaire, and to do that 
we need to end a treatment successfully. Therefore, after restarting all Z-Leafs (one on each 
computer) and restarting the experimenter computer from scratch, two more successful 
periods were completed. A discussion of this failure is in chapter 5.1 concluding the problem 
is probably not in the Z-Tree program in itself. 
 
1.6 Motivation 
The above chapters give a rough introduction of my motivation and experimental method. 
Somehow, I find it intriguing how people behave in social settings and experimental 
economics does this at point. Leaving out most noise that you find in environments that are 
more open and focus our attention at a specific modeled situation can give us valuable data to 
look into rather dynamic situations. I try to look into how people react to differences in 
  8 
   
contribution dependent on how large social group they are a member of. Giving me my 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis: Small groups lead to more punishment than bigger ones in a public good game 
with punishment, all else equal. 
2 Background 
Public good games and experimental economics as a whole seem to be on the move in the 
community of economists. There emerges new interesting papers continually, taking up a 
broad specter of exciting problems. 
 
2.1 The beginning of public good games 
Why do people contribute towards a common good, when they as individuals will be better 
off by freeriding? Several papers look into this. One early paper is with public good game by 
Marwell and Ames (Marwell and Ames, 1981). Their angle was the freeriding problem, the 
tragedy of commons, presented by Hardin (Hardin, 1968). They wanted to test this theoretical 
paper with experimental evidence. Their major finding is that in public good game 
participants contribute more than predicted by theory assuming income-maximizing players.  
Their participants contributed between 40% and 60%, which should indicate that people do 
not act entirely as assumed by this theory predicting no contribution. One interesting point 
from this paper is that people who studied economics contributed the least, around 20%. For 
my thesis, the relevant aspect is that people do contribute to give the participants something to 
react to in the next phase, the punishment phase. 
 
2.2 Introduction of punishment 
Preference for punishment behavior was first stated with one-shot ultimatum games (Güth, 
Schmittberger, Schwarz 1982), (Camerer, Thaler 1995). This is a game where we have two 
participants. One will be asked to divide an amount of money between himself (proposer) and 
the other person (receiver). The receiver can accept the offer and the payoff will be as 
proposed by the proposer. If, however, the receiver rejects the offer, the outcome will be zero 
for both of them. Even though every division can be supported as equilibrium, the subgame 
perfection will give us that it is likely that the proposer get all (or almost all) of the surplus. 
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The reason for this is that an income-maximizing receiver will accept any positive amount, no 
matter how small. Knowing this, the proposer proposes the least positive amount he is capable 
of. Contradictory to this, we find that small offers usually are rejected, and the reason as 
stated by participants post experiment is that they punish greedy proposers (Pillutla, 1996). 
 
2.3 Punishment in public good games 
We have confirmed above that people do want to punish others who they feel do an unfair act. 
I will now show you that this also is the case for public good games with punishment. In a 
public good game, there is a lot of room to freeride as stated by Marwell and Ames (1981). 
How do the participants react to such freeriding when they have the opportunity to punish 
each other? There is a wide selection of papers covering this, and other problems using public 
good games with punishment. Fehr and Gächter did a basic setup of a public good game with 
punishment (Fehr and Gächter,2000). In this paper, they showed that people punished 
freeriders even though this was a costly act. This contradicts the behavior of income-
maximizing individuals, who under such a context should not punish at all. 
 
The Fehr and Gächter experiment consisted of several periods. This can be a critical point, 
especially if there is not enough participants to run a total stranger set up, i.e. people never 
meet the same player twice in the same group during the experiment. Let me clarify. If people 
have a possibility to end up in the same group with another individual more than once, there 
are stronger incentives to punish as to build reputation. By this, you are telling the other 
player that you are willing to sacrifice substantial income, just to punish aberrant behavior. By 
doing this you hope to signal a credible act of punishing, as to make the other person 
contribute more in the following periods. However, in the final period there should then be no 
contribution even when such strategic incentives are present, but the case is that there is 
punishment even in the last round. A method to avoid this problem of reputation is to have 
enough participants to do a total stranger set up. This means that no one will ever meet the 
same player twice  during the treatment, and thereby no strategic incentives to punish. Even 
with this setup, people punish, indicating that there are other factors influencing people’s 
utility than just maximizing-income (Fehr, Gächter, 2000). 
 
In my experiment, it is costly to punish. You should think that punishment behavior changes 
with how cost and effect relate to each other. With effect I mean how much a punishment 
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point assigned, reduces the income of the receiver.  One experiment is looking into how 
changes in cost and effect of punishment alter punishment behavior of the participants 
(Nikiforakis, 2005). They conclude that you need a somewhat effective punishment before the 
contribution goes up in repetitive periods. Let’s say that punishment factor (amount of 
punishment you inflict by spending one token) is p . They conclude that for 0,1,2p  , the 
contribution is declining in repetitions of the game. In addition, the sum of income for all 
participants compared to the case with no punishment is lower. For 3,4p   and higher the 
scenario goes toward full contribution. In this case, they registered that the sum of income for 
all participants, after punishment costs, increased.  
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3 The experiment 
As mentioned, I am conducting a public good game with punishment. My main purpose is to 
find out if individual’s punishment behavior varies with respect to group size. Is free riding 
with respect to punishment effort more prominent in larger groups? I will explore this by two 
treatments with different subjects each time. 
 
3.1 Game technicalities 
In each of the two treatments, I had 16 subjects recruited from the student mass at the 
University of Oslo. When showing up at the experiment location participants registered by 
checking off a name list, drew their placement at random, and got a paper containing rules of 
conduction. Afterwards they found their seat, and waited until the rest of the participants 
showed up. 
 
We were three persons who conducted different experiments at the same time, so we 
cooperated about carrying out the experiments. We divided the areas of responsibility in such 
a way that for my experiment, all I did was controlling the Z-tree program. This way I had 
two assistants, one who read the instructions and one registered the participants at arrival. 
Both also helped during the experiment if needed. The same person read the instructions in 
each treatment. 
 
3.1.1 Set up 
When we were ready, all participants sat by their individual computer with Z-Tree started. 
The computers were set in two rows in such a way that the participants had their back to each 
other. In addition, walls were set up between each computer dividing all the participants. We 
did this to minimize communication and other sort of bonding that could influence their 
responses.  
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3.2 Rules 
Every participant got a copy of the instructions at their place. Moreover, my assistant read the 
exact text aloud. The instructions were in Norwegian and the whole session took place in 
Norwegian. 
 
During a treatment, we repeated the game ten times (periods). Each period consisted of two 
phases, contribution- and punishment phase. Each participant was endowed with 20 EMU 
(experimental monetary unit). 1 EMU is worth exactly 0.75 NOK
iii
, so their initial endowment 
was worth 15 NOK.  
 
The first decision they had to make were how much of their endowment they were willing to 
contribute towards a common project, given the fact that they faced punishment in the next 
phase. Instructions conveyed this to the participants.  
 
I will here write out the instructions in English (experiments were conducted in Norwegian), 
and show you the pictures of the screens as they showed up during a period. The screen 
pictures were not part of the instruction to the participants. The only difference between the 
two treatments was group size in the punishment phase. Written in brackets are rules applying 
to treatment with groupsize four, from now on defined as 16-4 (other treatment as 16-1) in 
punishment. 
 
 
<start of instructions> 
3.2.1 Introduction  
Welcome to this experiment and thank you for participating. Data from this session will be 
used in a master thesis to get knowledge of factors that influence people’s decisions. 
 
Your compensation for participating will depend on your, as well as the other person’s 
choices. 
                                                 
iii
 100 Nok = 12.35 Euro as of the 13th of April 2007 
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3.2.2 Basic rules and information 
1. All answers will be collected anonymously. 
o This means that all information is anonymous. Even if you later in the 
experiment will get information of choices made by others, you will not be 
able to pinpoint who made those choices. 
2. All cell phones have to be shut off. 
3. No communication between participants is allowed. 
4. You are not allowed to use any other program available on the computer other than the 
one you see in front of you now. 
5. If you need help; raise your hand and we will assist you. 
 
3.2.2 Setup 
You are now 16 persons participating. We are doing the experiment in 10 equal periods 
(rounds), each consisting of two stages; one contribution stage and one punishment stage. 
 
Stage 1 (Contribution phase) 
In the beginning of each period, you all are endowed with 20 EMU (experimental monetary 
units). 1 EMU is worth 0.75 NOK. Of this endowment, you are to decide how much you want 
to contribute to a common project. The total contribution from all 16 will be multiplied by a 
factor of 2, and then divided equally between all 16. 
 
Ex 1: If every of the 16 participants contributes all their endowment, the common project 
will get 16 times 20 EMU equal 320 EMU. This is multiplied with 2, so thus vi have 
640 EMU to distribute equally between all 16. I.e. each participant is left with 40 
EMU after the contribution phase. 
 
Ex 2: If all the others contributes all their endowment, and you nothing, you will get (15*20 
EMU*2)/16 = 37.5 EMU from the common project. You will then be left with 57.5 
EMU, and the other 15 gets 37.5 EMU each after the contribution phase.  
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You will then be asked to fill in your choice in the empty field and press “Contribute“. 
 
 
Screen 1: Here the participant will see his endowment (20) in the first line and in the second he 
can assign his contribution. This contribution must be between 0 and 20. 
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A new screen will appear with limited information of the outcome of stage 1. 
 
 
Screen 2: This screen shows the outcome after the contribution phase were the total contributions 
to the public good are multiplied by 2, and then divided equally to all 16 participants. 
 
This information is: 
 
1. Your contribution to the project 
2. Your average contribution for all players together 
3. Your income from tokens you chose not to contribute 
4. Your income from the project 
5. Your total income from stage 1 
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Stage 2 (Punishment stage) 
In the next stage, you will get an overview over all the other participants’ choices (screen 3a) 
[your group member’s choices (screen 3b)]. 
 
 
 
Screen 3a: To the left the participant sees the other 15’s contributions and incomes from the 
contribution phase. Behind each individuals information there is an empty field for assigning 
punishment points. 
To the right are the participants’ own contribution and income. In addition, there is also the 
average contribution for all participants. Beneath this is a general information box about the cost 
and effect of punishment points assigned.   
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Screen 3b: To the left the participant sees the other 15’s contribution and income from the 
contribution phase. Behind each individual of your group’s information, there is an empty field for 
assigning punishment points. 
To the right are the participants own contribution and income. In addition, there is also the average 
contribution for all participants. Beneath this is a general information box about the cost and effect of 
punishment points assigned. 
 
You will get the following data: 
 
1. Every others contribution 
2. Every others income 
 
In addition, there will be an empty field behind each participant [in your group] where you are 
to assign deduction points. All this information is anonymous so it is not possible to pinpoint 
whose information it is. There will also be an overview of your own data plus the average 
contribution for all.  
 
One deduction point assigned costs you 1 EMU. If you assign one deduction point to an other 
participant, his payoff will be reduced by 3 EMU. You can give up to 10 deduction points to 
each participant, but no more in total than your income from previous stage. All fields must 
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be filled out with a number between “0” and “10”. Before you can press the “Punish” button, 
you have to push the “Calculation” button as well. This will show you your total cost of 
deduction points assigned. You can change your mind, or press “Punish” for finally assigning 
your punishment. 
 
After this, a new screen appears with an overview of the end-result for this period. 
 
Screen 1 : End result for one period 
 
This screen shows the result after one period. The next screen is then screen 1 i.e. next period starts 
over again with 20 EMU in endowment. 
 
The information is: 
 
1. Your income at the first stage 
2. Your cost of assigning deduction points 
3. Amount of assigned deduction points to you from others 
4. Income reduction through deduction points assigned to you from others 
5. Your income this period, after punishment 
6. Your total income including all previous periods as well as this 
7. Your ID (only last round) 
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The income each period will not be less than zero. If this happens, your income will be set to 
“0”. Your income from each of the 10 periods will be accumulated and this will decide your 
final payoff. 
 
3.2.3 Questionnaire 
After the ten rounds, there will be a short questionnaire for background information. This will 
not influence your payout or results from the experiment. 
End of instructions. 
 
<end of instructions> 
 
The questions I asked were: 
o Sex (male, female) 
o Age (18-75) 
o What is your field of study? (economics, mathematics, psychology, others, not 
student) 
o On what level of education are you? (1-3 years [bachelor level], 4-5 years [master 
level], over 5 years, not student) 
o How did you get to know about this experiment? (email, poster, flyer, friends) 
o Have you participated in economic experiments before? (yes, no) 
o If you are interested in participating in forthcoming experiments, please fill in your 
email address. 
o Can you relate this experiment to situations in daily life, if so which? 
 
3.3 More on game setup 
The above sections were only an exact translation of instructions as presented to the 
participants. I will now go into details about the setup in a more mathematical fashion. 
 
3.3.1 Contribution phase 
The design of this common project is a standard linear public good game with n  participants, 
each endowed with y  EMU. As mentioned they then decided their contribution ic , 
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0 ic y  , and the rest iy c  were kept for themselves. i  corresponds to participant i . The 
sum of all contributions from all n  participants was multiplied by a factor  , and then 
divided out equally to the n  participants. Then we will get the outcome for a participant after 
the contribution period, i , like this. 
 
(1) 
1
n
i i i
i
y c c
n



     
 
The crucial part here is to create the right incentives by setting the value of  . We want a 
unique Nash equilibrium, for preferences of homo economicus
iv
, where no one contributes 
towards the common project. For this to hold we must set 0 n  . Then it will be best for 
every individual not to contribute because 1 EMU contributed only returns 
n

 EMU, which is 
less then 1 EMU. A contrast to this is that it is best for the group as a whole to contribute 
everything. I conveyed these points by two examples to the participants. The first were where 
everyone contributed all his or her endowment, the social optimum. The second all other 
except one, who contributed nothing, contributed all his or her endowment. I did this to 
enlighten the fact that you could earn more money than the others could by freeriding. 
  
3.3.2 Punishment phase 
The next step was the punishment phase. Here the participants got an overview of the other 
participant’s contributions and their income from the contribution phase. With this 
information at hand, they could assign punishment points towards other participants, three 
others in 16-4 and all 15 other in 16-1. 
 
One important point here is anonymity. During the treatments, subjects got no information on 
who contributed, or punished how. The only information was a list, randomized every period, 
containing information on all subjects’ contribution and income, but no information telling 
who contributed what (see screen 3a and 3b). In addition we changed groups in the 16-4 
treatment every period, making it impossible to recognize any pattern in individual behavior 
that could identify any participant.  
                                                 
iv
 Here, I define Homo Economicus  to only have preferences of monetary outcome for himself, the more the 
better. 
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They could assign between one and ten points towards each individual, but no more in total 
then their income from contribution phase. In other words, for each participant they were 
allowed to assign punishing points, ijp , where 0 10ijp   and ij i
j ì
p 

 . ijp  is participant’s 
i  assigned punishment points towards participant j  in his own group.  
 
As well as assigning points it is obvious that each participant faced the possibility to get 
punishment points by others. This is denoted by jip , participant i  received punishment points 
from participant j  in his own group (15 others in 16-1 and 3 others in 1-4). One punishment 
point assigned cost the sender   EMU and inflicted e  EMU reduction in the receiver’s final 
payoff this period. In addition, no participant could get a payoff below zero in a single period. 
If that happened, payoff was automatically set to zero for that period. We told every 
participant this fact through the instructions.  
 
The contribution- and punishment phase results in a final payoff for period t  given by: 
 
(2) max 0,t t t ti i ij ji
i j j i
p e p 
 
 
    
 
   
 
In my treatment 16n  , 2  , 20y  , 1   and 3e   so the final formula for my 
experiment will be:  
 
(3) 
1
16
1
max 0,
1
max 0,20 3
8
n
t t t t t
i i i ij ji
i i j j i
t t t t
i i ij ji
i i j j i
y c c p e p
n
c c p p


  
  
 
      
 
 
     
 
  
  
 
 
The final profit for every participant is all periods’ payoffs accumulated, giving the total 
payoff range for one participant for the entire treatment. 
 
(4) 
10 10
1 1 1
ˆ max 0,
n
t t t t t
i i i ij ji i
t i i j j i tt
y c c p e p
n


    
 
        
 
       
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On top of this came the show up fee as well. 50 NOK for the first treatment, and 100 NOK for 
the second. 
 
3.4 Treatment differences 
Below is a simplified representation in the two treatments. We see that the treatments is equal 
in the contribution phase, and that the only difference is how many you can punish in the 
punishment phase. 
 
 
 
My intention is to hold as much as possible equal in the two treatments. We see that all 
players contribute to the public good as a united group, implying that we probably have strong 
strategic incentives (reputation) for punishing in the punishment phase. Since this effect is 
close to identical in the two treatments, it should give low distortion of data.  
After the contribution phase in my 16-4 treatment, you got an overview over all the other 
participants, but it was only possible to punish three randomly and exogenously selected 
others in your contribution group. The group size was then four, and I used the stranger 
function in Z-Tree i.e. the groups changed every period
v
. This is also an argument for the 
above statement about reputation building not distorting data. 
                                                 
v
 It is an option in Z-Tree called stranger. This option shuffles the group composition every period and thereby 
creates different groups. 
 
Treatment 16-4 
 
Contribution phase 
 
 All 16 participants in the same group 
contributing to the same public good 
 
Punishment phase 
 
4 participants in the same group (4 groups all 
together), can only punish those three others 
in the same group 
 
Treatment 16-1 
 
Contribution phase 
 
All 16 participants in the same group 
contributing to the same public good 
 
Punishment phase 
 
16 participants in the same group, everyone 
can punish all other subjects 
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In the 16-1 treatment, the contribution phase was equal to 16-4, but the punishment phase was 
not. In the punishment phase in 16-1 the participants got the information of all the others, as 
in 16-4, but now they could punish every one of the 15 other participants. This way I ensured 
that, I only changed one factor between the two treatments. So considering the above section, 
I believe I made the treatments as equal as possible in all other aspects then the group size in 
punishment phase. 
 
Regarding my experiment, some papers have been looking into groupsize effects with both 
contribution and punishment. Jeffrey Carpenter has been doing some experiments involving 
different groupsize (Carpenter, 2002). In the treatment, he had two treatments of the following 
difference, one with groupsize of five and one with groupsize of ten. The distinction from my 
thesis is that the groups in Carpenter’s paper were identical in both contribution and 
punishment phases (I only varied the size in punishment phase). His conclusion in this paper 
was that groupsize did not have any or little effect on punishment, but contribution rose 
significantly more rapidly and to a higher level in the treatment with groups of ten. 
 
One of the most recent papers (Carpenter, 2006), discuss this topic loosely in the end by 
introducing shirking cliques. Shirking cliques can submerge if the team size is so large that 
there develops smaller working groups. If for example in such a case members of this 
working group can deter reciprocators (see chapter 4 for reciprocity) from punishing shirkers, 
we have a so-called shirking clique. However, they conclude under their assumptions that 
group size is not significantly influencing how or how much people punish.  
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4 Theory 
In this experiment, we look into some of the fundamental human traits. It is almost like a 
version of crime and punishment, but with crime replaced by not contributing. How do people 
react to the level of contribution, prospective punishment, or punishment in it self? 
 
In my experiment monetary incentives is a main force. I will, for that reason, in this and the 
next chapters discuss different preferences for monetary outcome.  
 
 
4.1 Homo economicus 
When we represent the economic stereotype of Homo sapiens, we often use the term Homo 
economicus. This is a term introduced into economics as to simplify theoretic models. Many 
of well-known and fundamental models, both in macro- and micro- economics, have this 
requirement.  
 
One definition of Homo economicus is that he is a rational and self-interested actor
vi
, with 
preferences only for his own access to material goods. With rationality in this setting, we 
mean that the person maximizes utility, using efficiently the options available to him. In my 
experiment, an immediate characterization of a Homo economicus participant would be one 
who will try to get as high monetary outcome for himself without regard for any of the other 
participants (assuming he prefers monetary outcome). 
 
In this experiment, we ran the treatments for 10 rounds. We can then argue that even a 
rational and self-interested actor may contribute and punish to build up reputation. He may 
want to give an impression of himself as a cooperator, by contributing, to make others 
contribute to the public good. He would even punish others at a cost for himself if he thinks 
he will gain from the increase in contribution in the following rounds. This would only hold if 
one or more of the players were not a utility-maximizing Homo economicus. Let me clarify. 
Assume all participants are rational and self-interested as by the definition of Homo 
economicus. Then everybody knows that in the last round no one will contribute or punish. 
No punishment will happen when this is costly to the punisher, as it is in this experiment. By 
                                                 
vi
 Homo economicus from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. 
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this, there will also be no contribution, since a Homo economicus actor will be better off by 
not contributing given all the other participants choices (contributions). We realize by using 
backward induction that we have subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (Robert Gibbons, 1992) 
for all rounds that imply no contribution and no punishment. I.e. there will not be any 
contribution or punishment in any of the rounds. 
 
4.2 Other theories 
From prior experiments mentioned in the background chapter, we know that people do 
cooperate and punish others. We need other models to portray human behavior and I will 
explain some of them and tell why this is relevant for my experiment. 
 
4.2.1 Inequity aversion 
People tend to compare themselves with others quite extensively. An inequity adverse person 
has preference for equality. He prefers equality when comparing himself with others, and any 
inequality reduces his utility. This does not mean that he does not care for monetary payoff 
for himself, indeed he does. For example if you and another person do the same type of work, 
contributing the exact same effort, have the same pay, but suddenly one day you get a raise. If 
you are an inequity averse person, you will not enjoy the full increase in utility due to this 
extra money. The inequity between you and your coworker is reducing your utility. Reduction 
will not be so severe as to offset the whole gain in utility (with normal parameters), but a 
reduction nevertheless. 
 
This of course raises new difficult questions on how people measure and perceive fairness of 
outcomes (Fehr, Schmidt, 1999). In this paper, Fehr & Schmidt presented an intuitive model 
to represent utility of individuals in such a setting with equity and fairness. A requirement for 
this model is that people have information about others’ payoffs, as they will have in my 
experiment. The base model is that the subject compares his own outcome with the others’. If 
his own outcome is less, or higher, than that of the other person, his utility will be lower. qAn 
equation for this statement is as follows. 
 
(5)   max | ,0 | max | ,0 |i i i j i i i jU x x x x x x       where i j  
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Here is  iU x  individual i ’s utility that consists of three parts. ix  is his monetary payoff and 
then if individual j  has a higher payoff, he subtracts a share, i , of this difference, j ix x .  If 
however individual i  has a higher payoff, then he will subtract a share i  of this difference, 
j ix x . Typically we have that i i  , i.e. he weighs inequity in his disfavor more than if it’s 
in his favor.  
 
Equation (5) is for two individuals and is derived from a more general function (see the Fehr 
& Schmidt article), but I believe the two participant equation expresses the experimental 
situation under punishment phase adequately. If you remember that participants got an 
overview of information of all the others’ individual choices, it should be natural to compare 
oneself with one participant at a time. This way, if the other participant had contributed little 
and gained much from the public good compared to oneself, the incentive to punish should be 
clear. Another possibility is that he (in addition) looks at the average contribution for all and 
compares this with both his own and the other person’s contribution. 
 
 
 
However, the problem for the participant is not only if he is going to punish, but also how 
much to punish. In this experiment, he has to take into account all the other participants 
actions. How much will they punish? Will they punish me? That is why groupsize can be of 
importance. With many potential punishers who can punish each other it may be the case that 
those who punish believe that someone else will step up and punish defectors. In a way, they 
want to freeride on others punishments. A smaller group there a fewer others who can punish, 
so you will feel a stronger incentive to step up and punish. 
In the above statement, I linked inequity-aversion with punishment. When one period is over 
the participants have gained experience of how the others contributed, as well as punished. 
Example:  If you contribute 18 EMU and the other person only 2 EMU in a two player 
public good game. Then you will have 22 EMU and he will have 38 EMU 
after the contribution phase. Inserted in (5) we get: 
 
  22 max | 38 22,0 | max | 22 38,0 |
22 16
i i i
i
U x  

    
 
 
  Then he has incentive to punish as to minimize the difference in payoff. 
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For example if you realize that you gave less than a majority (or average) of the others (this 
requires an inequity model with n  subjects, I will not go into that one here). If you expect 
others to behave approximately the same way in the next round, and if you consider inequity 
of each round separately, you will contribute by inequity-aversion more in the next round, 
given no punishment. Alternatively, maybe the other way around is more evident. When you 
gave more than the average for all in one period, you will try to even out this inequity and 
contribute less the next period, still assuming no punishment. This way you hope to get closer 
to the average contribution and thereby trying to maximize your utility. 
 
4.2.2 Reciprocity 
Reciprocity is a preference to repay kindness with kindness and unkindness with unkindness. 
As opposed to inequity-aversion, reciprocity takes into account the process for the outcome 
(Sobel, J., 2005). Positively interpreted actions elicit positive responses and vice versa. This 
opens up for a more subjective and complex thought, and the model reflects that. I will not go 
into mathematical details, as it is more complicated than the one above. When we are dealing 
with models of reciprocity, we need to assess the beliefs of the involved subjects. 
 
 
 
The effect of reciprocity on contribution and punishment are similar to those in inequity-
aversion. After the contribution phase you may prefer to punish those you believe have 
contributed little, believing they are unkind. You then feel better by punishing as stated above. 
Another reaction takes place for the next round’s contribution. Let us say you feel that others 
have contributed less than you because they are unkind. Then you contribute considerably less 
the next round as to impose unkindness towards the other participants. We see that the effect 
is similar, but the psychological cause is different. In inequity-aversion, we punish to adjust 
Example: Let us get back to our study group mentioned in chapter 1. You suspect that 
a person in the group did not prepare adequately, and that he did this as an 
unkind act. This reduces your utility (you feel bad or maybe some anger). 
You decide to sanction against him by telling an insulting joke, frowning, or 
telling him straight up. By doing this you feel a bit better. Your utility has 
increased. Not fully, but you feel better than if you did not take action. 
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outcome as to make people equal, while in reciprocity we react more directly by feelings of 
fairness. 
 
4.2.2 Altruism 
In economics several versions of altruism have been, and still are, discussed. We start with the 
classical approach were a person’s utility depends on others utility. I.e. I get higher utility 
when others’ utility increases.  
 
There are two cases of special interest, pure- and impure altruism. Pure altruism, in this 
thesis’s context, is that a person cares about others’ access to a public good. In this 
experimental setting this can manifest itself by higher contribution toward a public good. 
Worth mentioning is the fact that pure altruists also contribute more even when others 
contribute less. 
 
(6)  ,i iU V x G  
 
Here ix  is own payoff and G  is the magnitude of the public good. Both first derivatives are 
positive. We see then with proper assumptions we can get some contribution based on pure 
altruism (Andreoni, 1998). Andreoni has also published some papers containing discussion of 
impure altruism. This type of altruism builds on the pure model, but in addition, there is a 
factor of “warm glow” by giving. A person gets higher utility by just giving. 
 
(7)  , ,i i iU W x G g  
 
Here ig  is what he gives, for example to charity (Andreoni, 1990). In a public good game, we 
can think of this as if the participant gets higher utility by contributing both because he raises 
the value of the common good, and because he values his own contribution in it self. 
 
When it comes to punishment, Fehr and Gächter looked into why people punished each other 
even though there was no monetary gain in doing so. They did this with a public good game 
with punishment. They repeated the game, but rearranged the groups for each period such as 
no participants ever were on the same group twice. There were no strategic incentives to 
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explain their punishment behavior, so they concluded that punishment was altruistic (Fehr & 
Gächter, 2002). It can be strange to think about punishment as an altruistic act since both the 
punisher and punished get reduction in income, but remember that this experiment was 
repeated. They interpreted the punishment altruistic in the sense as they were willing to take 
the cost of punishing as to uphold a large contribution, even though they knew they never 
would meet that person later in the experiment. 
 
In my experiment, every participant contributed to the same public good each round. One 
important factor of punishment is therefore an incentive to build reputation, but the effect of 
altruistic punishment is probably present. 
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5 Results 
The treatment with 16 participants and punishment groupsize of four went well. Unfortunately 
the treatment where all has the ability to punish all treatments crashed. I put much effort in the 
programming and preparation for the experiments, so I did not have time to redo the 
experiment which failed. What I got of data is ten full rounds of the successful (16-4) 
treatment and three of the failed one (16-1). I did two additional rounds, and will be using 
these as to get five rounds of 16-1. 
 
5.1 Problems 
The treatment where there was only the group who could punish each other went without 
trouble at all (16-4). The other treatment however did not go as smoothly. It stopped after few 
rounds the first time we ran it with participants, and almost immediately after start, some 
computers dropped out of the Z-tree client’s overviewvii. At that time, we did not have the 
skills to tackle the problem satisfactory, so we cancelled the experiment and paid every 
participant their show up fee. 
 
Immediately after the participants had left, we tested the experiment for us selves in full scale, 
i.e. all 16 computers connected. This time we made ten satisfactory rounds, and everything 
seemed to be in order as it had been in all the other full-scale test experiments. 
 
For that reason, I did not change any major lines in my program and conducted a second 
experiment with the same program (minor changes). However, we changed the placement of 
the router, as explained later. After three successful rounds, it stopped again. This time I got 
the data from the three first rounds, so there is some data to analyze. We decided to restart the 
experimenter-computer and just run it for two more rounds. These two rounds went by 
without trouble. The participants then got the payoff from these two rounds multiplied by 5, 
as we informed them. We did this to get to the questionnaire part of the experiment (can only 
be started after successful ending of a treatment).  
 
Under follows some solutions and notes about the problem. 
                                                 
vii
 This is a table over computers connected to the Z-Tree experiment. This is available for the experiment leader 
in realtime during a session. 
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5.1.1 Router 
Sometimes when computers fell out of the clients table the reason were that the client 
computer (the computer the participant used) no longer were connected to the router. In the 
first experiment, the router stood in one end of an oblong room. With 16 participants, there 
may be a possibility that so much mass (bodies, walls, etc.) would block or at least hinder the 
communication between router and computer. A support for this theory is that computers at 
the far end of the router most commonly lost connection. The next time we placed the router 
at the middle of one of the long walls, and as far as we are aware of we did not experience any 
more network dropouts. Therefore, it can be an idea to have a more powerful router and think 
well about the placement of this. 
 
5.1.2 Program 
As mentioned over I do not think there is a direct fault in my programming. A reason for this 
is that I have run the program in full scale many times at my own computer as well as when 
testing the lab. Other limitation that can be the cause is the size of the contracts table. 
Contracts table is a special table in Z-Tree that collects data from every sender (the one who 
assigns punishment points) to every receiver (participants who receives the punishment points 
assigned from sender). With 16 participants punishing 15 others, this table has 240 lines with 
data. The other treatment with groups of four has only 48 lines of data. That this table is 
updated live as soon as someone enters a number at their screen is another point. This way I 
believe that there were too much going on at the same time for the network to handle. In our 
trials, we were only four to six persons doing the testing. It was impossible for us to enter data 
at such a rate to get this kind of error, and that one of the reason we did not discover this fault 
sooner. 
 
Another point regarding this is that the program locked when I were adjusting the width of 
tables at the server computer. It may be the case that this is what caused the treatment to shut 
down. One solution to this is to not do anything on server/experimenter computer during 
treatment, this way ensuring that all computer resources is used for handling dataflow.  
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5.1 Data summary 
The first table I will present is average numbers for contribution and punishment for all 
rounds. I will characterize round four and five in 16-1 as not entirely consistent, when the 
treatment crashed after round three, but still use them in my analysis. 
  
5.1.1 Contribution and punishment 
First, we look at the development of contribution and punishment in the two treatments. In 
papers mentioned in the background chapter there were substantial evidence that with my 
cost/effect ratio contribution should rise through the rounds. My experiment confirms this, by 
the graph below. Contribution increases steadily, but more rapidly in the 16-1 treatment. In 
addition, it looks from my data that in the 16-1 treatment, contribution is at a higher level 
compared to 16-4. 
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Graph 1: Average contribution and punishment points assigned each round for both treatments. 
 
When we look at punishment, we see that there is quite extensive punishment in both 
treatments for the first round. However, it seems as it stabilizes for both treatments. Another 
point is that it looks as if 16-1 punishment is lower than 16-4 punishment, indicating support 
for my hypothesis. As discussed below, contribution has a great impact on punishment, so if 
we look at punishment relatively to contribution we have an effect that defies my hypothesis. 
Since contribution seems to be higher in 16-1 than in 16-4, this will have an impact on how 
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people punish, and in this setting weakening my hypothesis. These effects are controlled for 
in my regression. 
 
5.1.2 Individual punishment received 
We have seen above that average contribution and punishment points assigned differs in the 
two treatments. The problem however is to test my main hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: For any given individual contribution by individual i , individual i  is 
punished less by others in the 16-1 treatment than in the 16-4 treatment. 
 
I will do that by linear regression, testing for 
 
0H : For any given individual contribution by individual i , individual i  is punished 
equal by others in the 16-1 treatment and in the 16-4 treatment. 
 
1H : For any given individual contribution by individual i , individual i  is punished 
differently by others in the 16-1 treatment than in the 16-4 treatment. 
 
To test this properly I have to find the variables that influence punishment points received the 
most. I will here list up those I believe are essential: 
 
o “group”:  this indicates which experiment the data is from. “0” is 16-4 
   and “1” is 16-1. “group” will be the variable we will check for 
   influence on received punishment points. 
o “contribution”: this is the contribution toward the public good of the participant 
   receiving punishment points. Obviously, this should have a 
   impact on punishment points received. High contribution will 
   probably give less punishment points from others. 
o “receivedpoints”: total numbers of punishment points received by the participant 
   from the other potential punishers. This is our dependent  
   variable, making the two others independent. 
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From table 1 we see that received points correlates quite little with group(treatment). The 
same conclusion for contribution versus group, but we see that the correlation between 
contribution and received points is quite high, as anticipated.  
 
 
             |    group contri~n receiv~s 
-------------+--------------------------- 
       group |   1.0000 
contribution |   0.0722   1.0000 
receivedpo~s |  -0.0817  -0.7768   1.0000 
 
Table 1: Correlation matrix for selected variables. 
 
We are now ready to do a regression with received points as the dependent variable. The 
regression formula is as follows: 
 
(8) recievedpoints constant+ group+ contribution     
 
The result is represented in table 2: 
 
 
              Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     240 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,   237) =  180.81 
       Model |  4017.36626     2  2008.68313           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  2632.92957   237  11.1094075           R-squared     =  0.6041 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6007 
       Total |  6650.29583   239  27.8255056           Root MSE      =  3.3331 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
receivedpo~s |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       group |  -.2879078    .457594    -0.63   0.530    -1.189379    .6135633 
contribution |   -.648927    .034315   -18.91   0.000    -.7165284   -.5813255 
       _cons |   13.33072   .8144468    16.37   0.000     11.72624     14.9352 
 
Table 2: regression results 
 
We see that “contribution” has an impact on “recievedpoints” which is negative and 
significantly different from zero. The negative impact means that a high contribution leads to 
less punishment points received from others. “group” has also a negative impact on 
“recievedpoints” (supports my prediction), but we see that the p-value is way too high for the 
effect to be significantly different from zero. We cannot discard the H0-hypothesis based on 
the data produced in my experiment. However, I believe that this opens up for additional 
experiments to get a complete dataset to analyze.  
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5.2 Why this “simple” regression? 
 
It is important to notice that I look at total punishment points received and not punishment 
points assigned towards each individual. This is because I needed consistency in my data. If I 
had looked at assigned punishment points towards each individual, I would clearly created 
additional difficulties when you in one treatment punish three participants and in the other 
fifteen. Obviously, you punish each individual more when there is only three to punish 
compared to the treatment with fifteen and it would be unnecessarily complex to design a 
regression taking this into account. 
 
5.2.1Critique 
One main weak point with this regression is that the participants learn from round to round. In 
many papers, they take the four first rounds as learning rounds. I.e. four first rounds are not 
taken into account in the analysis. This is to ensure that the subjects have a feel for the 
mechanism or rules of the experiment. Since I did not accomplish to complete one of the 
treatments, I did not have the opportunity to leave out any rounds.  
 
Another aspect about learning is the fact that the outcome from the previous rounds has an 
impact on choices made in this round. When you have gotten harsh punishment because you 
contributed little in one round, this will probably influence your contribution in the next and 
following rounds. This can influence how people behave and characterize individual 
participants. Witch types of other participants they are playing against can also influence this. 
Example, a low contributor can punish those who contribute little, a high contributor may not 
punish anybody etc. This may lead to differences in how the game is played out. I have, 
however not gone into this. 
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6 Summary and conclusion 
Behavioral economics is about how people really behave contrary to profit maximizing actors. 
I have conducted a public good experiment with the opportunity to punish. The game 
consisted of two phases, one contribution phase and one punishment phase. In contribution 
phase participants chose how much to invest towards a public good. In the punishment phase, 
the participants could react to the others contribution by punishing individuals. The result 
does not lead to any conclusion since the p-value is too high. Even if the sign is negative as 
predicted, there is no evidence in the dataset confirming my hypothesis.  
 
After all this work with programming and planning of the experiments, it is somewhat sad 
that the outcome were so limited in hard data. Nevertheless, I have gained experience in 
exactly those aspects of running an experiment, planning and preparations. When it comes to 
contribution to the behavioral economics community, I believe this experiment have some 
valuable insights. 
 
First, the script is ready for further experimenting on this topic. Even though the treatment 
stopped because of the earlier mentioned problems, I believe it is possible to redo the 
experiment successfully with existing script and program solution (z-Tree). By considering 
the discussion in chapter 5, it should be possible to get data for the 16-1 treatment. One of the 
most important and easiest changes is to let the experiment run without doing any 
unnecessary work on the server computer. 
  
Second, looking at the data and regression output we see that there is a negative, but 
insignificant effect for groupsize. However, since the size of the estimate is relatively large 
and with the sign predicted by my hypothesis, this seems worth looking into with further 
experiments. 
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7 Appendix 
 
7.1 Instructions for the participants in Norwegian 
Norwegian version of instructions to the participants, read aloud by one of the assistants. 
 
7.1.2 Treatment 16-1 
<start of instructions> 
 
Introduksjon 
Velkommen til dette eksperimentet og takk for din deltagelse. Data fra dette partiet vil 
bli brukt i en masteroppgave for å forstå mer om hvilke faktorer som påvirker 
menneskers valg. Kompensasjonen for din deltagelse her avhenger ikke bare av dine 
valg, men også de andre deltageres valg. 
 
 
Regler og informasjon 
1. Alle valg vil bli samlet anonymt 
2. Det betyr at man verken under eksperimentets gang eller etterpå vil ha 
mulighet til å finne ut hvem som svarte hva. 
3. Alle mobiltelefoner må være skrudd av. 
4. Ingen kommunikasjon mellom deltagere er lov. 
5. Det er ikke lov å bruke annen programvare enn den dere ser foran dere nå. 
6. Hvis du trenger hjelp; rekk opp hånden, og vi vil komme og hjelpe deg. 
  
 
Oppsett 
Dere er nå 16 deltagere. Vi skal gjøre eksperimenter i 10 like perioder. Hver periode 
består av to faser: En bidragsfase og en straffefase. 
 
Fase 1 (Bidragsfase) 
I begynnelsen av hver periode vil du bli tildelt en beholdning på 20 EV (eksperiment 
valuta). 1 EV er verdt 0.75 kr. Av denne beholdningen skal du bestemme deg for hvor 
mye du vil gi til et felles prosjekt, og hvor mye du vil beholde selv. Om du vil bidra, og 
hvor mye, er helt opp til deg. De samlede bidragene til fellesprosjektet fra alle 16 blir 
ganget med 2, og så delt likt ut igjen til alle 16. 
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Etter at du har bestemt hvor mye du vil bidra med, trykker du ”Bidra” -knappen. En ny 
skjerm vil komme frem med informasjon om utfallet av bidragsfasen. Informasjonen 
er: 
 
1. Ditt bidrag til prosjektet 
2. Gjennomsnittlig bidrag fra alle deltagere 
3. Din beholdning etter bidrag 
4. Din inntekt fra prosjektet 
5. Din samlede inntekt etter bidragsfasen i denne perioden 
 
Etter at du har sett over denne siden, trykk ”Fortsett” –knappen for å komme til 
straffefasen. 
 
Fase 2 (Straffefase) 
I denne fasen vil du få en oversikt over alle de andre deltagernes utfall og valg. Du vil 
få følgende informasjon: 
 
1. Den andres beholdning etter bidragsfasen 
2. Den andres bidrag 
 
All denne informasjonen er anonym, og det er ikke mulig å se hvem som har valgt 
hva. 
 
Det vil også være en oversikt over ditt eget utfall fra bidragsfasen 
 
I tillegg vil det være et tomt felt bak hver av deltagerne hvor du kan angi straffepoeng. 
 
Hvert straffepoeng du gir til en deltager koster deg 1 EV. Hvis du gir annen deltager 
ett straffepoeng vil dette føre til en gevinstreduksjon på 3 EV hos denne deltageren. 
Du kan gi opp til 10 straffepoeng til hver deltager, men ikke mer totalt enn din 
beholdning etter bidragsfasen. 
 
Alle felt må fylles ut med et nummer mellom ”0” og ”10”. Før du kan trykke ”Straff” –
knappen, må du trykke ”Beregn” –knappen. Denne vil vise deg total kostnad for deg 
av de straffepoengene du har gitt til andre. Du har da muligheten til å endre ditt valg, 
eller fortsette til neste skjermbilde ved å trykke ”Straff” –knappen. 
 
Du vil da få følgende oversikt over resultatet for denne runden: 
 
1. Din inntekt etter bidragsfasen 
Eks 1: Om alle 16 gir hele sin beholdning vil det si at fellesprosjektet får 16 ganget 
med 20 EV lik 320 EV. Dette ganges med 2. Altså har vi 640 EV å dele likt 
ut på alle 16, som gjør at hver og en av dere sitter igjen med 40 EV etter 
bidragsfasen. 
 
Eks 2: Om alle gir hele sin beholdning, og du ikke gir noe. Så vil du få 
(15*20 EV*2)/16=37,5 EV igjen fra fellesprosjektet. Du vil da sitte igjen med  
57,5 EV, mens de andre vil ha 37,5 EV etter bidragsfasen. 
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2. Din kostnad av å dele ut straffepoeng 
3. Antall mottatte straffepoeng til deg fra andre 
4. Inntektsreduksjon for deg av straffepoeng fra andre 
5. Din inntekt etter begge fasene (bidrag - og straffefase) 
6. Din totale inntekt sammenlagt for alle perioder til nå 
7. Ditt ID-nummer 
 
Beholdning etter endt periode vil alltid bli høyere enn eller lik null. Om resultatet 
skulle bli negativt vil dette automatisk gjøres om til null. Inntekten fra alle rundene vil 
bli lagt sammen, og dette vil avgjøre din endelige utbetaling. 
Viktig:  I runde 10 (den siste) vil du få en ekstra linje med informasjon (7 i kursiv 
over). Noter dette nummeret på utbetalingsskjema og skriv inn ”1” i det 
tomme feltet. Dette er bare en hindring for at du ikke skal klikke deg 
videre før du har skrevet ID-nummeret ned. 
 
 
Spørreskjema 
Etter den siste runden vil det bli et spørreskjema for bakgrunnsinformasjon. Dette vil 
ikke ha innvirkning på verken eksperimentet eller din utbetaling. 
 
<end of instructions> 
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7.1.3 Treatment 16-4 
<start of instructions> 
 
Introduksjon 
Velkommen til dette eksperimentet og takk for din deltagelse. Data fra dette partiet vil 
bli brukt i en masteroppgave for å forstå mer om hvilke faktorer som påvirker 
menneskers valg. Kompensasjonen for din deltagelse her avhenger ikke bare av dine 
valg, men også de andre deltageres valg. 
 
 
Regler og informasjon 
1. Alle valg vil bli samlet anonymt 
a. Det betyr at man verken under eksperimentets gang eller etterpå vil ha 
mulighet til å finne ut hvem som svarte hva. 
2. Alle mobiltelefoner må være skrudd av. 
3. Ingen kommunikasjon mellom deltagere er lov. 
4. Det er ikke lov å bruke annen programvare enn den dere ser foran dere nå. 
5. Hvis du trenger hjelp; rekk opp hånden, og vi vil komme og hjelpe deg. 
  
 
Oppsett 
Dere er nå 16 deltagere. Vi skal gjøre eksperimenter i 10 like perioder. Hver periode 
består av to faser: En bidragsfase og en straffefase. 
 
Fase 1 (Bidragsfase) 
I begynnelsen av hver periode vil du bli tildelt en beholdning på 20 EV (eksperiment 
valuta). 1 EV er verdt 0.75 kr. Av denne beholdningen skal du bestemme deg for hvor 
mye du vil gi til et felles prosjekt, og hvor mye du vil beholde selv. Om du vil bidra, og 
hvor mye, er helt opp til deg. De samlede bidragene til fellesprosjektet fra alle 16 blir 
ganget med 2, og så delt likt ut igjen til alle 16. 
 
Etter at du har bestemt hvor mye du vil bidra med, trykker du ”Bidra” -knappen. En ny 
skjerm vil komme frem med informasjon om utfallet av bidragsfasen. Informasjonen 
er: 
 
1. Ditt bidrag til prosjektet 
2. Gjennomsnittlig bidrag fra alle deltagere 
3. Din beholdning etter bidrag 
4. Din inntekt fra prosjektet 
Eks 1: Om alle 16 gir hele sin beholdning vil det si at fellesprosjektet får 16 ganget 
med 20 EV lik 320 EV. Dette ganges med 2. Altså har vi 640 EV å dele likt 
ut på alle 16, som gjør at hver og en av dere sitter igjen med 40 EV etter 
bidragsfasen. 
 
Eks 2: Om alle gir hele sin beholdning, og du ikke gir noe. Så vil du få 
(15*20 EV*2)/16=37,5 EV igjen fra fellesprosjektet. Du vil da sitte igjen med  
57,5 EV, mens de andre vil ha 37,5 EV etter bidragsfasen. 
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5. Din samlede inntekt etter bidragsfasen i denne perioden 
 
Etter at du har sett over denne siden, trykk ”Fortsett” –knappen for å komme til 
straffefasen. 
 
Fase 2 (Straffefase) 
Dere blir delt inn i grupper på 4 og 4. Gruppenes sammensetning endres hver 
periode. I denne fasen vil du få en oversikt over alle deltagernes utfall og valg. Du vil 
få følgende informasjon: 
 
1. Den andres beholdning etter bidragsfasen 
2. Den andres bidrag 
 
All denne informasjonen er anonym, og det er ikke mulig å se hvem som har valgt 
hva. 
 
Det vil også være en oversikt over ditt eget utfall fra bidragsfasen 
 
I tillegg vil det være et tomt felt bak hver av deltagerne i din gruppe (3 tomme felt) 
hvor du kan angi straffepoeng. Du kan altså bare straffe de som er i din gruppe, og 
de kan bare straffe deg. 
 
Hvert straffepoeng du gir til en deltager koster deg 1 EV. Hvis du gir annen deltager 
ett straffepoeng vil dette føre til en gevinstreduksjon på 3 EV hos denne deltageren. 
Du kan gi opp til 10 straffepoeng til hver deltager, men ikke mer totalt enn din 
beholdning etter bidragsfasen. 
 
Alle felt må fylles ut med et nummer mellom ”0” og ”10”. Før du kan trykke ”Straff” –
knappen, må du trykke ”Beregn” –knappen. Denne vil vise deg total kostnad for deg 
av de straffepoengene du har gitt til andre. Du har da muligheten til å endre ditt valg, 
eller fortsette til neste skjermbilde ved å trykke ”Straff” –knappen. 
 
Du vil da få følgende oversikt over resultatet for denne runden: 
 
1. Din inntekt etter bidragsfasen 
2. Din kostnad av å dele ut straffepoeng 
3. Antall mottatte straffepoeng til deg fra andre 
4. Inntektsreduksjon for deg av straffepoeng fra andre 
5. Din inntekt etter begge fasene (bidrag - og straffefase) 
6. Din totale inntekt sammenlagt for alle perioder til nå 
7. Ditt ID-nummer 
 
Beholdning etter endt periode vil alltid bli høyere enn eller lik null. Om resultatet 
skulle bli negativt vil dette automatisk gjøres om til null. Inntekten fra alle rundene vil 
bli lagt sammen, og dette vil avgjøre din endelige utbetaling. 
 
Viktig:  I runde 10 (den siste) vil du få en ekstra linje med informasjon (7 i kursiv 
over). Noter dette nummeret på utbetalingsskjema og skriv inn ”1” i det 
tomme feltet. Dette er bare en hindring for at du ikke skal klikke deg 
videre før du har skrevet ID-nummeret ned. 
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Spørreskjema 
Etter den siste runden vil det bli et spørreskjema for bakgrunnsinformasjon. Dette vil 
ikke ha innvirkning på verken eksperimentet eller din utbetaling. 
 
<end of instructions> 
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